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Abstract. This study examines whether corporate political connections influence tax aggressiveness in state-owned 
enterprises and private-owned enterprises in Indonesia. The observation period is 2015 to 2017. The population taken is a 
state-owned enterprise and a non-financial sector private sector business entity with 327 companies with a period of 3 years. 
Then the determination of the sample using purposive sampling method, used a sample of 148 companies. This research use 
panel data as a research method. The results of this study indicate that the existence of political connections in state-owned 
enterprises and private-owned enterprises has a significant positive effect on tax aggressiveness. 
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Introduction 
Political connections often occur in developing 
countries where political connections are made by 
placing parties that have closeness with the 
government, so that the government has connections 
to the company's organizational structure, whether 
commissioners or directors (Fisman, 2001). In 
Indonesia, this often occurs especially in 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), namely by 
conducting a number of filling and turnover of 
state-owned commissioners from volunteers, 
coalitions, as well as from members of political 
parties to assume positions as State-Owned 
Enterprises commissioners. The purpose of the 
existence of political connections one of which is an 
act of tax avoidance by companies by minimizing 
the tax burden within limits that do not violate 
regulations, because tax is one of the factors of 
profit reduction. The amount of the tax as we know 
it depends on the amount of income. The higher the 
level income earned, the greater the tax that must be 
paid. Therefore, companies need proper tax planning 
so that companies pay takes correctly and efficiently. 
The one way to do this is by carrying out tax 
aggressiveness. In this study will look at how the 
influence of companies both State-Owned 
Enterprises and Private-Owned Business are 
politically connected with the government towards 
their tax aggressiveness actions.  
Tax aggressiveness is part of tax planning which 
aims to reduce the value of taxable  profits that are 
still in accordance with tax regulations (Frank et al., 
2009). Tax aggressiveness refers to how tax 
avoidance is legal and safe because it does not 
conflict with tax regulations and discloses full 
information to tax authorities. The methods and 
techniques used are likely to exploit the weaknesses 
contained in the tax laws and regulations themselves 
and do not violate tax laws. Companies that make 
political connections, in general, often carry out tax 
aggressiveness. This was done by the company in 
order to have a lower risk of detection because 
politicians also provide protection to companies that 
are connected with it so that the risk of tax 
avoidance can be lower. Then the company can have 
better information about changes to tax regulations 
in the future. The impact that is also felt is the low 
pressure from the capital market to carry out 
transparency and the potential to reduce political 
costs related to tax planning activities through tax 
aggressiveness. Not only that, political connections 
also benefit companies to gain access to the central 
government (Kim et al., 2016). 
Theoretical Thinking Framework and 
Hypothesis Formulation 
There are two sides that connect political 
connections with tax agreements (Kim et al., 2016). 
The first is the political connection made by SOEs is 
to lobby with the government to avoid tax audits, 
submission of tax penalties and other actions 
classified as tax evasion or tax aggressiveness. 
Political connections made will have a good 
influence on tax aggressiveness called Political 
Favoritism Effect. 
Secondly, the government has the authority to 
establish and evaluate the executive parties in 
State-Owned Enterprises, both the board of 
commissioners and the board of directors. Awards 
were also given to SOEs that contributed to the 
payment of high taxes. This phenomenon has also 
occurred in Indonesia. This proves that the 
government plays a dominant role in political 
connections so that it gives a bad influence on tax 
aggressive action so that it is called the Bureaucratic 
Incentive Effect. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Hypothesis Formulation 
The Effect of Political Connections on Tax 
Aggressiveness 
According to Zhang et al. (2012) and Kim et al. 
(2016), political connections can have a positive or 
negative impact on tax aggressiveness. The positive 
impact of political connections is getting preferential 
treatment from the government in terms of taxation 
such as avoiding tax audits. Political connections 
also have a negative effect on tax aggressiveness. In 
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state-owned enterprises, the executive members both 
the board of commissioners and the board of 
directors are determined and evaluated by the 
government. Although there are a number of 
considerations in evaluating, one of the 
government's considerations is the company's 
contribution to state revenues through tax payments. 
This will make the board of commissioners and 
directors retained or given promotional rights to the 
company. Larger state-owned enterprises to 
reinforce their political legitimacy and be able to 
play a deeper role in managing the company so that 
the company can contribute more to state revenues. 
The government also gives appreciation in the 
form of awards given to companies both 
State-Owned Enterprises and Private-Owned 
Business Entities that contribute greatly to the state 
through high tax payments (Kim et al., 2016). 
Seeing this phenomenon, both companies that are 
state-owned enterprises and privately-owned 
business entities will compete with each other with 
other companies in order to be able to make a major 
contribution to the country through high tax 
payments. 
The existence of political connections will also 
make the company obtain special treatment, such as 
the ease of obtaining capital loans and the risk of 
low tax audits, thus making the company more 
aggressive in implementing tax avoidance which 
results in decreased financial report transparency. In 
addition, companies that have political connections 
with the government in power are proven to have a 
significantly high level of tax avoidance when 
compared to companies that have no political 
connections (Kim et al., 2016). Based on the 
explanation above, the research hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
H1 = political connection has a negative effect on 
tax aggressiveness.  
Research Methods 
Population and Research Samples 
The population in this study is a state-owned 
enterprise and a non-financial sector private 
enterprise (banking, insurance, securities and 
leasing). This is because it is difficult to get a 
regression component to get ETR values from 
companies in the financial industry (especially 
banks).  
Then, it is focused on state-owned enterprises and 
private-owned business entities that go public, 
assuming that state-owned enterprises and 
private-owned enterprises that go public have 
required reporting of financial and annual reports to 
the public, making it easier for researchers to 
identify. From this population, the sample was taken 
by using purposive sampling method according to 
the type and criteria needed. The criteria specified in 
the sampling are as follows: 
1. The company of a state-owned enterprise and a 
private-owned business entity in the 
non-financial sector listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2015 - 2017. 
2. Companies that are not delisted during the 
observation period. 
3. No loss during the observation period. 
Research Variable 
 
The dependent variable in this study is tax 
aggressiveness which is measured using effective 
tax rates (ETR). ETR is measured by 2 proxies, 
namely Current ETR and ETR Cash. 
 
1.   Current ETR, is used to see the ETR value of 
the company for the current tax burden. 
 
            
                                 
    
 
 
2.   ETR Cash, reflects the company's ability to pay 
a small amount of cash taxes per currency from 
EBIT. 
         
               
    
 
 
The independent variable in this study is political 
connections through the board of commissioners or 
directors, measured by dummy variables. Value 1 if 
there is a board of commissioners or directors whose 
members are former presidential candidates, 
members of the people's legislature, serving as 
chairman / member of a political party, government 
officials, and as military officials both active and 
non-active (Adhikari et al., 2006). 
The control variable used in this study is profit 
growth as measured by Ln EBIT, company size 
measured through Ln total assets, Return on Assets 
and Debt Equity Ratio. 
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Analysis Model 
The analysis model in this study is to use two 
models: 
 
1
st
 Model (Cash ETR) 
CashETRi.t = ɑ + β1POLCONi.t + β2GROWTHi.t + 
β3FIRMSIZEi.t + β4ROAi.t + β5DERi.t +      
 
2
nd
 Model (Current ETR) 
CurrentETRi.t = ɑ + β1POLCONi.t + β2GROWTHi.t + 
β3FIRMSIZEi.t + β4ROAi.t + β5DERi.t +      
 
Explanations : 
 
           = Cash Effective tax rate 
company i in year t 
              = Current Effective tax rate 
company i in year t 
POLCONi.t = Dummy variable, Polcon 
company i in year t 
          = Ln EBIT company i in year t 
            = Ln total asset company i in 
year t 
       = Return of Asset company i in 
year t 
       = Debt Equity Ratio company i 
in year t 
     = Error 
Results and Discussion 
Description of Research Object 
Table 1  
Research Object 
 
Criteria   Total 
State-owned enterprises and private sector 
non-financial sector companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015 - 
2017. 
327 
Companies x 3 
years 
981 
Companies that are not delisted during the 
observation period. 
327 
Companies x 3 
years 
981 
 
 
Criteria  Total 
   
No loss during the observation period. 148 companies 
x 3 years 
444 
Total number of samples (Ni,t)  444 
Source: Data processed, 2019 
Selecting of The Best Model Data Regression Panel 
Table 2  
Model Selection 
 
Description Test   Score Conclusion 
1st Model Chow 
Test 
Cross Section Chi 
Square (Stat) 
220.457.623 RE Model 
Cash ETR Prob 0.0001   
  Hausman 
Test 
Cross Section 
Random (Chi-Sq 
Stat) 
17.710.999   
  Prob 0.0702   
2nd Model Chow 
Test 
Cross Section Chi 
Square (Stat) 
412.923.141 RE Model 
Current ETR Prob 0   
  
Hausman 
Test 
  
Cross Section 
Random (Chi-Sq 
Stat) 
4.157.740   
  Prob 0.3851   
Source: Data processed, 2019 
 
The chosen model is Random Effect Model, so 
there is no need to do a classic assumption test 
(Baltagi, 2008; Ekananda, 2016). 
Conclusion of Panel Data Regression Results and 
Hypothesis Tests 
Table 3  
Conclusion of Regression Test & Hypothesis Test Results 
 
Variabel 
CashETR 
(Y1) 
Current ETR 
(Y2) 
Conclusion 
Intercept 
Coef -2.548583 -0.083655   
t-Stat -2.973983*** -0.509617   
Polcon  
0.314691 0.060453 H1 Rejected 
  2.513100** 2.410677**   
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Variabel 
CashETR 
(Y1) 
Current ETR 
(Y2) 
Conclusion 
Growth  
-0.781419 -0.087817   
  -11.01662*** -7.904104***   
Firmsize  
0.80411 0.090258   
 
9.980476*** 6.932141***   
ROA  
3.485481 0.273667   
  6.236553*** 3.091199***   
DER  
-0.113061 0.004551   
  -2.812690*** 0.609609*   
Adj R Square 0.229079 0.163153   
F Statistic 27.32741*** 18.27365***   
*** Sig & Prob < 0,01 
** Sig & Prob < 0,05 
 
  
* Sig & Prob < 0,1     
Source: Data processed, 2019 
Results and Discussion 
The effect of political connection variables on tax 
aggressiveness 
Political connections through the relationship of 
commissioners and directors show significant results 
with a positive effect on tax aggressiveness. Then 
the hypothesis in this study is rejected. These results 
contradict Zhang et al. (2012) which show that 
political connections negatively affect tax 
aggressiveness, but the results of this study also 
support the results of previous studies (Adhikari et 
al., 2006) which show that political connections 
have a positive effect against tax aggressiveness. 
According to Adhikari et al. (2006) and Kim et al. 
(2016), stated that the existence of a connection with 
the government was able to have a negative impact 
on tax aggressiveness. In state-owned enterprises, 
the good executive members of the board of 
commissioners and directors want to maintain their 
position as board of commissioners and directors of 
the state-owned enterprises, or they want to be given 
promotion rights to larger state-owned enterprises 
reinforce its political legitimacy. Then the next 
reason is that the government also gives 
appreciation in the form of awards given to 
state-owned enterprises and private-owned 
enterprises that contribute greatly to the country 
through high tax payments (Kim et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
 
Our result support the previous research that has 
been done by Adhikari et al. (2006) also provides 
results that political connections have a significantly 
positive effect on ETR. Their results show that 
companies do not always use political connections 
to avoid taxation, but can be used to obtain capital 
assistance and various funding benefits. The 
advantage that can be obtained by companies that 
have political connections is that loans can be 
obtained more easily. 
 
The effect of control variables on tax aggressiveness 
 
All control variables used in this study 
significantly influence tax aggressiveness. 
Conclusion 
Based on data analysis and discussion that has 
been done, it can be concluded that the results of 
panel data regression prove that statistically, 
political connections through the relationship of 
commissioners / directors significantly positively 
influence tax aggressiveness. This evidence that 
existence of a connection with the government was 
able to have a negative impact on tax aggressiveness. 
The board of commissioners and directors want to 
maintain their position as board of commissioners 
and directors of the state-owned enterprises, or they 
want to be given promotion rights to larger 
state-owned enterprises reinforce its political 
legitimacy. Then, the government also gives 
appreciation in the form of awards given to 
state-owned enterprises and private-owned 
enterprises that contribute greatly to the country 
through high tax payments.  
A limitation of this study is the use of ETR as a 
proxy for tax aggressiveness. The BTD (Book Tax 
Difference) is also a proxy for measuring the tax 
aggressiveness. BTD is the gap between pre-tax 
profit reported in the financial statements issued by 
the company (book income-commercial income) 
and taxable profit reported to the taxation apparatus. 
Suggestions for further research are expected to use 
BTD or both (ETR and BTD) as a proxy for 
measurement of tax aggressiveness variable. 
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